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1. Introduction 
Real estate market forecasts are now integral to decision-making processes for 
many major real estate investors, supporting asset allocation, real estate fund 
strategy and stock selection. With better availability of data and technology, 
modelling has become increasingly sophisticated, with a range of procedures now 
commonly used in real estate forecasting. These may include a combination of ‘pure’ 
judgemental techniques, theory-driven econometric methods and non-theoretical 
time series analysis.  However, the quality of real estate forecasts reflects not just 
the quality of the forecasting model but also the quality of the organization’s 
intervention in the formation and output of the model. In this paper, we examine the 
ways in which human (subjective) judgement impacts on the process of real estate 
market forecast production and the consequent effects on outcomes.  In so doing, 
the research draws upon concepts both from cognitive psychology and from 
principal-agent theory that emphasise the potential of biases and incentives to 
influence the nature of task performance.  
 
The academic literature on real estate market formation is now voluminous.  We cite 
only a few examples below, drawing from Newell et al (2003).  The last 15 years 
have seen rapid progress in the methodology of forecasting real estate rents, stock 
levels, returns, yields and cash flows (e.g: Benjamin et al, 1993; Brooks and 
Tsolacos, 2001; Chaplin, 1998, 1999, 2000; D’Arcy et al, 1999; Gardiner and 
Henneberry, 1988, 1991; Malizia, 1991; McClure, 1991; McGough and Tsolacos, 
1995; Sivitanides, 1998; Wheaton and Torto, 1988).  A great deal of research has 
been carried out on econometric and structural modelling of real estate markets (eg: 
Chaplin, 1999; D’Arcy et al, 1999; Gardiner and Henneberry, 1988, 1991; Malizia, 
1991; McClure, 1991; McGough and Tsolacos, 1995; Tsolacos, 1998; Tsolacos et al, 
1998).  In addition there has been limited work on comparison of forecasting 
procedures (e.g.: Brooks and Tsolacos, 2001; Chaplin, 1998, 2000; Wilson and 
Okunev, 2001; Wilson et al, 2000).  Confirming many studies outside the real estate 
sector, in many instances simple forecasts (e.g.: via naïve predictors) have been 
found to be more accurate than complex econometric models (Chaplin, 1999, 2000; 
Wilson et al, 2000).  It is evident from academic literature that the majority of 
forecasting methodologies are based upon econometric modelling.   
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  In the immediately following 
section, we examine the nature of, rationale for and effects of the use of judgement 
in forecasting.  This draws mainly upon previous research in the forecasting literature 
but also includes a review of related research in real estate.  The subsequent three 
sections outline the methodology and results of an interview study of UK real estate 
forecasters which focuses on the role and consequences of the use of judgement in 
the forecasting process.  Finally, we draw conclusions. 
 
2. Judgement in forecasting 
In broader forecasting research, the role of judgement in statistical procedures and 
pure judgemental forecasting itself have been well-established research areas for 
two decades.  However, relatively recently, Welch et al (1998, 97) were able to claim 
that their research “for the first time (our italics) connects the psychological study of 
human judgement with the substantial forecasting literature on extrapolation of time 
series data”.  In forecasting, there has been increasing interest in systematic biases 
that are (arguably) inherent to the processing of complex problems by human beings 
(e.g. Fisher and Statman, 2002).  Such biases are well-documented in the literature, 
being based around the “heuristic” behaviours first identified by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) and subsequently investigated across a range of contexts, of 
which behavioural finance has been among the more fruitful.  In the forecasting 
context, most interesting of these biases is the potential to succumb to (or avoid) the 
errors that arise through use of the “representativeness” and “availability”.  This 
growing interest in the implications of cognitive psychology underscores the 
importance of better understanding the role of judgement in the forecasting process.   
 
We can identify five broad areas in which judgement can be introduced to the 
forecasting process.  These are:- 
 
i. Quantitative model formation. 
ii. Evaluation and modification of quantitative model output by forecasters 
iii. Evaluation of and modification of ‘preliminary’ forecasts by experts and users. 
iv. The use of non-quantitative (pure judgemental) forecasts. 
v. Implementation of forecasts by users. 
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In this paper the main focus is on econometric models and the ways in which their 
outputs are produced and mediated.  Although they are widely used in the wider 
business community, we do not discuss the use of “pure”judgemental forecasts.   
 
For econometric models, it is generally accepted that a purely objective forecast is 
unattainable.  The ‘right hand side’ variables are selected on the basis of a 
combination of theory and empirical research.  Judgment is unavoidable in the 
selection of variables to be included - the omitted variable problem is a common 
cause of model misspecification.  In terms of the specification, “mathematical models 
involve smoothing constants, coefficients and other parameters that must be decided 
by the forecaster” (Walonick, 2004, 2).  These choices will influence the forecast 
output.  The forecaster will also have to make decisions about forecast horizon, 
forecast interval, data selection, data treatment and choice of computational model.  
Focusing on financial modelling, Thomaidis (2003, 14) points out that   
 
“An integral part of econometric modelling is the selection of appropriate 
financial data and an initial filtering method to reduce unnecessary noise.  
At this stage both good domain knowledge and good statistical methods 
are important.  The two initial stages are the most crucial steps in the 
modelling process” 
 
The widely acknowledged limited availability and capriciousness of much real estate 
market data means that data issues often involve critical forecaster decisions.  
Further, notwithstanding the above, there are also limitations to pure mechanical 
forecasting processes that force judgmental intervention on forecasters.  
 
An underlying assumption of econometric forecasting is that past patterns will 
continue into the future.  Or, as Guilkey (1999) more vividly puts it: better 
econometric modelling only forecasts the past with greater precision.   Although 
Clements and Hendry (1999) ascribe forecast failure to factors such as inadequate 
theory, inaccurate observations and structural breaks, they argue that it is structural 
breaks that are the underlying cause of forecast failure.  They emphasise the role of 
political, economic and technological shocks in causing shifts in the economic data 
that render previous models obsolete.  This produces a situation where model 
specification can be irrelevant to performance, in that correctly specified models can 
be outperformed by poorly specified models.  However, another source of forecast 
failure is inaccuracy of forecasts of the ‘right hand side’ variables. 
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Where many of the explanatory variables are also forecasted, Fildes and Stekler 
(2002) emphasise the importance of treatment of forecasts of model inputs.  For 
instance, previous ‘outsourced’ forecasts of explanatory variables may in the past 
have displayed systematic errors e.g. were too pessimistic or optimistic.  Turner 
(1990) illustrates that variations in the way in which forecasters decide to incorporate 
such knowledge (sometimes called ‘putting the model back on track’) will produce 
variations in forecasts.  Given the wide range of potential sources of error in ‘pure’ 
model output it is not surprising that the use of judgement subsequent to model 
application is often regarded as a positive contribution to the forecasting process. 
 
The value of the contribution of judgement to forecast output, relative to model 
output, will be a partial function of the credibility of the forecast to both forecasters 
and users.  This will be affected by the modelling issues already discussed such as 
quality and availability of data, explanatory power of model, uncertainty (confidence 
intervals) in the forecasts and stability in the forecast environment.  Where there 
have been recent shifts in relationships between variables or events create new 
conditions, statistical output may need to be subjectively adjusted.  Research has 
shown that there is indeed widespread use of expert opinion in the formation of 
forecasts (Dalrymple, 1987).  However, this can be a double-edged sword since 
market experts bring, often crucial, contextual knowledge while being subject to the 
biases and inconsistencies noted above (Batchelor and Dua, 1991). 
 
In addition, researchers are increasingly acknowledging that forecasters (far from 
uniquely) are social entities, with individual characteristics that interact with 
institutional, social, political and cultural contexts, in turn, influencing forecast 
outcomes (Gjaltema, 2001).   An obvious example is the much cited bias of equity 
analysts in optimistic forecasting of the performance of companies who are clients.  
The equity analyst scandals have highlighted that forecasts can often be 
disseminated throughout an organisation or made public, can be controversial and 
contested and then can be tested and falsified.  There can, therefore, be a whole 
range of incentives and pressures on forecasters. 
 
It is not surprising then that from an agency perspective, Corder (2003) suggests that 
there are often incentives for a rational bias in forecast outputs.  For instance, Laster 
et al (1999) concluded that forecasters consider both forecast accuracy and potential 
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publicity in selecting forecast outcomes.    They found that forecasts which are made 
to generate publicity tend to be further from the consensus than forecasts generated 
by analysts in other sectors.  The balance between the need for publicity and a 
requirement for accuracy provides conflicting pressures for convergence (herding) 
and divergence in forecasts.  Croushore (1997) suggests that  
 
“some (survey) respondents might shade their forecasts more toward the 
consensus (to avoid unfavourable publicity when wrong), whilst others 
might make unusually bold forecasts to stand out from the crowd.”    
 
By emphasising the importance of users’ “prior commitment”, Armstrong (1985) 
implicitly recognises the need for acceptance of forecasts by users.  He also 
suggests that forecasts with unpleasant consequences can often create problems 
with the response being to change the forecast rather than the plan. For instance, 
Griffith and Wellman (1979) found that hospitals purchased forecasts and then 
ignored those with pessimistic outcomes.  This may reflect a bias of avoiding 
disconfirming evidence and seeking confirming evidence.  Interestingly, when 
examining how the trend in time series influences judgemental extrapolation, 
O’Connor et al (1997) found that people have significant difficulties dealing with 
downward sloping series. 
 
Linked to the incentives for forecasters to herd and to maintain credibility, a corollary 
is that there is a lack of volatility in forecasts relative to actual outcomes.  Clements 
(1995, 419) investigated the role of judgement in creating excessive smoothness in 
forecasts and tentatively conclude that judgemental “adjustments tend to reduce the 
variation over time in forecasts”.  In seminal work in this area, Nordhaus (1987) 
speculates that the lack of volatility in forecasts relative to actual outcomes could be 
due to factors such as the need to reach a consensus and to maintain forecast 
credibility by avoiding major ‘jumps’. 
 
As noted above, the majority of work on real estate market forecasting has focussed 
on statistical techniques and there has been limited work on the use of judgement in 
forecasting. However, despite this increased sophistication in forecasting 
methodologies, it has been recognised that differences in real estate forecasts still 
occur due to differences in the structure of the econometric models, statistical 
procedures and data used (Mitchell and McNamara, 1997), as well as the use of 
potentially flawed economic forecasts (Higgins, 2001).  In the US, Guilkey carried out 
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a detailed analysis of private sector real estate forecasting models in terms of their 
parameters, methodology and outputs.  He identifies important differences in their 
variables used, model specifications, the exogenous variables which are obtained 
from macro-economic forecasts providers. With regard to the latter, he found that the 
organisations providing macro-economic forecasts to real estate forecasters used 
different explanatory variables.  Where they had overlapping explanatory variables, 
the three macro-economic forecasting providers were using different assumptions 
about interest rates, federal expenditures, exchange rates, GDP growth.  He also 
finds that after the forecasts are determined econometrically, “all three of the major 
players reserve the right to subjectively alter the forecasts on the basis of specific 
information they have about the MSA” (Guilkey, 1999, 30).  In turn, even where real 
estate forecasters are using the same provider of macro-economic forecasts, the 
data is being ‘massaged’ very differently by the different providers. As a result, he 
identifies widespread disagreement amongst forecasters concluding that 
“real estate forecasts make use of other peoples’ supply and demand 
forecasts but they get to their conclusions using very different 
methodologies and obtain very different MSA rankings”  
(Guilkey, 1999, 40). 
 
In research that measured the accuracy of real estate market forecasts in the UK, 
Newell et al (2003) found evidence of forecast inertia.  They concluded that 
persistent over-estimation and under-estimation in real estate forecasts suggested a 
smoothing or inertia effect in which significant new information is needed before 
major revisions to prior real estate forecasts are done.  
 
The foregoing gives reason to believe that subjective human judgement, exercised 
by experts and applied to quantitative forecasting model outputs, is both an important 
and complex dimension in the process in forecasting real estate markets.  The 
following sections describe an investigation of this process as it operates in UK-
based forecasting providers. 
 
3. Methodology 
Given that the subject under investigation was expected to involve at least some 
complex behaviours and relationships, it was considered that it was unlikely to be as 
effectively modelled by an approach based on traditional positivist assumptions as by 
an interpretivist approach (broadly termed).  The latter was therefore chosen as a 
more appropriate basis for the research design, and adopted in a pragmatic fashion, 
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seeking an appropriate balance between the need for generalizability and participant 
authenticity. 
 
The technique chosen for data collection was semi-structured interviews.  Nineteen 
interviews, each approximately one hour long, were conducted with individuals who 
were either responsible for the production of property market forecasts and/or for the 
production of property market forecast advice that incorporated the use of such 
forecasts1.  The individuals within this sample frame represent, in the view of the 
researchers, a very substantial sub-set of the property forecasting services available 
from UK-based organizations.  The resulting quality of this sample lends support to 
the authenticity of the findings as representative of the UK property market 
forecasting “industry”.  It should be borne in mind, however, as expanded upon 
below, that this industry is itself relatively small in relation to the number of providers 
and, within this provision, diverse as to its intrinsic functions and its integration with 
other property services. 
 
The interviews were guided by a common question framework that had been 
developed from the researchers’ prior knowledge of the subject and from a review of 
the literature (supra).  The purpose of this framework was to ensure that, as far as 
possible, the data collection focused on the specific area of research interest, both 
across the sample and in relation to each respondent.  It is acknowledged that by 
controlling the interview agenda2 this approach involves a potential compromise 
between generalizability and discovery.  This is not, however, regarded as a 
significant problem in the study and is in any event mitigated by the interviewees 
having been invited, at the end of the interview, to discuss any other issues not 
prompted by the interviewers’ questions. 
 
Both researchers were present at all of the interviews.  In order to facilitate reflection 
upon and analysis of the interview data, all interviews were, with the agreement of 
the interviewees, recorded and subsequently transcribed.  The analysis and 
interpretation was further assisted by the use of textual analysis software.3  This 
enabled selected passages of the transcribed interviews to be coded against 
                                                 
1  At four of the interviews an additional person was present.  This was in each case someone with 
experience of property market forecasting, working with the interviewee. 
2  i.e. By excluding an invitation to talk about things which interviewees may have wished to talk about, 
but which were not prompted by the framework. 
3  QSR NVivo version 2.0.163. 
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particular concepts or themes.  While this coding is possible manually, the software 
improves subsequent organization, retrieval, inspection and manipulation of the 
material covering these concepts and themes, including exploration of linkages, and 
efficient viewing of the context from which the passages are extracted.  This aids the 
researcher in the task of developing a fuller understanding of the interview material. 
 
In order for this coding to be carried out, it is necessary to identify the underlying 
concepts or themes.  In the present study, these were identified by reference to the 
ideas that formed the initial interview framework, added to by the researchers’ own 
reflections on what they recalled as salient issues emerging from the discussion.  
Further additions and refinements to the codes were made in the process of coding 
itself, as reading of the transcripts revealed new themes or modifications to existing 
ones.  In strict methodological terms, the pre-coding of the data, even if only partial, 
imposes an element of the researchers’ own structural understanding on the 
analysis.  Providing the initial coding is treated as provisional, however, the approach 
adopted in this study is regarded as an acceptable strategy in the literature (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). 
 
Each code was given a name (in some instances cryptic, because of the naming 
limitations in the software) and an accompanying description.  The description is 
important because what matters is the meaning of the concept, within its context, 
rather than its name.  This led to the identification of 61 codes, shown in alphabetical 
order in Appendix 1 alongside their descriptions.  The transcripts were accordingly 
coded.  In order to achieve consistency across all the transcripts (i.e. to ensure 
maximum reliability in the use of the codes) the coding of all transcripts was carried 
out by one of the researchers.  A check was conducted by having the second 
researcher code three randomly selected transcripts.  The outcome of the resulting 
comparison pointed to substantial agreement across most codes but with a small 
number of differences4.  However, since interpretation of the transcripts against these 
codes would be carried out by both researchers, inter-actively between themselves, 
this level of difference was considered to be acceptable. 
 
                                                 
4  Evaluation of the level of agreement was done intuitively rather than through the use of an inter-coder 
agreement measure, since the latter would require the adoption of a protocol for determining 
agreement/disagreement.  Given that this would have a degree of subjectivity, and given the nature of 
the material, the researchers do not believe such a quantitative measure would add to the credentials 
of the analysis. 
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During the analysis and interpretation, these codes were grouped and cross-linked 
(and, in a few cases, coalesced) so as to better clarify the nature of the underlying 
ideas and the relationships between them.  This led to five major groupings. One 
grouping covered the context within which the forecasting was being carried out, and 
was to an extent factual in nature (e.g. what variables were being forecast, what 
markets etc).  The other four groupings centred in turn upon: how forecasts were 
communicated to users and then used; issues surrounding the forms of econometric 
models that were being used; the ways in which forecasters evaluated their success 
or failure; and how quantitative forecasts might be adjusted by the qualitative 
judgements of “experts”.  What follows in this paper is principally directed at the first 
(the context) and last (the qualitative adjustment process) of these groupings.  The 
other results will be reported elsewhere. 
 
4. The context of forecasts 
4.1 The interview sample 
All nineteen main interviewees had current and prior involvement in the production of 
property market forecasts.  The nature of this involvement varied across the sample5.  
While all had responsibility, mostly at a senior level, for some or all of the 
organization’s forecasts, their role in production varied along a spectrum from 
detailed involvement in the mechanics of statistical modelling through to mere 
oversight of the process, the implementation of which was carried out by others.  The 
term “forecaster”, used in this paper to describe these people, must be interpreted 
taking this variability in function into account. 
 
The organizational profile of the 19 interviewees was as follows.  Six worked for 
organizations whose core business was property consultancy and agency (“agents” 
in the traditional “jargon”)6; six worked to support the fund management activities of 
their employing organization; two worked for banks; and one was responsible for 
forecasts in a large publicly quoted property company.  Of the remaining four, two 
worked in organizations where the primary function was forecasting (although only 
one of these was focused solely on property); and two were in organizations offering 
forecasting advice as part of a broader investment advisory service.  Within these 
broad categories, the actual role of the interviewees in forecasting varied.  One 
obvious variation was in the geographical spread of the forecasting focus.  Although 
                                                 
5  In some cases the interviewee’s experience had been gained in more than one organization. 
6  A further three, not in this category, also had substantial experience of working as forecasters for 
property consultants/agents. 
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all those interviewed were involved to some degree in forecasting of UK markets – 
though in some cases highly centred on key markets - several also had a strong 
European market focus.  Another difference was in the extent to which those 
forecasting were involved in the process of investment decision-making.  This was 
more likely to be the case within the fund manager category. 
 
4.2 Variables forecast 
In both the UK and Europe7, the property market variable most frequently forecast is 
change in rental value.  In large part, this is because information to support modelling 
of these rents is more widely available than for other property-specific variables.  This 
rent forecast is usually for prime, “avoiding extreme locations”.  This was referred to 
as a “top rent” but also as “prime/average” and in one cases “average rather than 
prime”, indicating some variation in perceptions of this benchmark.  Almost invariably, 
it is nominal rents that are being forecast, but one interviewee made the distinction 
between these and real rents: 
 
“Theoretically, any economist would say you ought to be modelling the 
rate of change in real rents but that does not necessarily mean that that 
is how real estate markets actually operate.   Empirically, we find in most 
cases the rate of change of nominal rents works better than the rate of 
change of real rents”.   
(Forecaster working for Bank)8 
 
In some cases, these prime forecasts are augmented by forecasts for other grades of 
property, usually where the forecasting organization owns such property and wants 
to project returns for existing assets or funds.  Where these additional forecasts are 
not produced, fund managers are expected to adjust the prime figures when applying 
them to different grades of property.  An exception to the “prime” basis is the well-
known alternative basis of the (now) CB Richard Ellis index: “we’re forecasting the 
best building in the best location with the best tenant”. 
 
The forecasting of yields is also undertaken, to a lesser extent than rents, and usually 
in conjunction with total return forecasting.  For total return, the yield forecasts were 
frequently done by reference to the Investment Property Databank (IPD) indices, at 
the all-property and major sector and segment levels.  Alternatively they were 
                                                 
7  In Europe, the markets and sectors for which the key variables are forecast is more limited than in the 
UK – see page 12. 
8  The attributions relate to the organization in which the forecaster was working at the time of the 
experience being described (and not always the organization in which they are currently working).  
The attribution is styled “Forecaster working for…” throughout to remind readers that it is the 
forecaster’s views and experience that are being examined and not that of the organization, per se. 
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performed to feed into valuation models, applied to the organization’s portfolio to 
generate total returns going forward.  One interviewee made the distinction being UK 
and US practice in this regard: 
 
“In the UK, we get total returns by forecasting value change, which is 
driven by rents and yields here, and income return, so you need to 
forecast the yield shift.  In the US we don’t disaggregate those 
components of change in value, we just value change.”  
(Forecaster working for Forecaster/Investment Adviser) 
 
A number of interviewees, however, pointed to problems with yield forecasts, where 
their experience had been that they “were far too difficult” or had “been failing 
hopelessly”. 
 
Prime vacancy rates are also forecast by some, but by no means as extensively as 
rents.  The same is true of depreciation forecasts, although this appeared to be done 
is a fairly rudimentary way, and generally expressed as long-term averages for 
different markets. 
 
4.3 Markets and sectors forecast 
The forecasting carried out by the interviewees varied widely in relation to the 
markets and geographical scope of coverage.  For the UK, most are producing 
forecasts at national and regional level of the main market sectors - retail, office, 
industrial - with some doing (usually) selective sub-analyses of these either by type 
(e.g. retail warehouse, in-town retail) or location.  Outside of London, the local 
forecasts go down to individual town-, or, in some cases, or county-level.  The extent 
of the coverage and sub-sector analysis was naturally driven by the kind of service 
the forecasters were seeking to provide, which in turn was a function of the kind of 
organization in which they were working. 
 
While providing a broad overall service, some focused on specific types in particular 
regions - the most obvious example being prime offices or retail in one or more of the 
central London sub-markets - because that is where the organization’s or client’s 
property focus lies.  Conversely - for the same reason - some forecasters ignored 
some sectors or regions (with the example of Welsh industrials being cited more than 
once as holding little interest for clients).  In a couple of cases, the view was put that 
regional forecasts were sometimes of little use, justified in one of these cases 
because of the scarcity of suitable properties in some regions. 
 
”We don’t often produce regional forecasts because the regions are of 
very little consequence and it becomes very location specific.  We have 
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to do London, Thames Valley, Scotland and the rest of the UK but we’ve 
abandoned doing regular forecasts of South West, East and East Anglia 
etc.  It is really of very little consequence what you think of East Anglia 
when there are really only three of four centres or one regional head 
office location…so you have to get past the region.” 
(Forecaster working for Property Consultant)   
 
This recognition of the importance of getting down to the local town or city level was 
repeated often, though practical considerations relating to the quality and long-run 
availability of data militated against its implementation.  With large portfolios – one 
interviewee referred to clients with four or five hundred properties - another factor 
working against the production of local level forecasts was the scale of the task. 
 
For Europe, and reflecting the relative immaturity of European property markets, the 
focus is on major cities or even centres within those cities.  Most notable in the latter 
respect are the major office centres, although most interviewees who are involved in 
Europe described activity or plans to extend into retail (both “High Street” shopping 
centres and out-of-town) and into secondary office locations.  All appeared to be in 
the process of extending the number of cities for which they prepared forecasts.  A 
few were already well under way (e.g. one producing forecasts for 21 office markets, 
11 retail markets and 11 industrial markets).  This process, driven by investor 
demand for assets in these locations, appears constrained at present, however, by 
the shortage of an adequate supply of robust data upon which to base forecasts. 
 
4.4 Frequency of production and forecast horizon  
Most forecasts produced by those in the interview sample were done so on a 
quarterly basis.  This appears to be driven by the fact that the economic data, which 
constitute the most important inputs to most models, are themselves updated 
quarterly.  Sometimes, this linkage was less strong, and so the frequency was bi-
annual or even annual.  This occurred, for example, where, rather than adopt directly 
economic data from an outside source, the forecast would utilise a “house view” on 
the economic inputs, with this being adjusted less frequently than quarterly.  Another 
justification for less frequent up-dating is because of the perceived pace of normal 
property market movements.  
 
“We do bi-annual forecasts because in normal market conditions the 
property market isn’t that fast moving, so that seems to work reasonably 
well”  
(Forecaster working for Property Consultant)  
 
Local models are another exception, where they are cross-sectional in form and so 
by their nature are less tied to runs of economic data.  These tend, in at least some 
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cases, to be either updated only every six months or produced an ad hoc, rolling 
basis. 
 
The most typical time horizon for forecasting is five years.  The reasons for this are 
based on the typical time horizon over which forecasts of the economic inputs are 
available, coupled with a widespread view that at or beyond five years (or 
thereabouts) there is a strong likelihood of a reversion to a long term trend.  This 
trend reversion was often described in terms of the property market cycle, although 
views differed as to whether this meant it was difficult to know where the cycle would 
be at the forecast horizon or, by contrast, that one could assume that the term of 
cycle was typically five years:  
 
”We will revert to that long term trend after the end of the forecast horizon 
and will make clients aware that we’re not sure where we will be in the 
cycle at that stage.” 
 
“When you start your forecast you’re at a certain point in the cycle and if 
you take your objective as trying to plot how the market will move through 
the remainder of this cycle, five years seems reasonable.”  
(Different Forecasters, both working for Property Consultants). 
 
Three to five years was also justified as a suitable horizon for investors who are 
using the forecasts to plan trading or capital investment decisions.  In some cases 
forecasters are producing longer term forecasts – typically ten, twenty or, in one 
extreme instance, 40 years - but generally solely for internal use, or at the specific 
request of clients (e.g., bank clients, because of the longer term nature of their 
loans).  There was some scepticism, however, about the merit of going beyond five 
years: “after 10 years, it’s a lifetime away”.  
 
In some instances the horizon is shorter, and one interviewee, working for a property 
consultant, suggested that a lot of clients sought forecasts with a two-year horizon.  
Others questioned the value of short-term forecasts, especially over the very short-
term, given the investment horizons of most property investors: 
 
“Most real estate investors in our world, at least, aren’t particularly 
interested in what is going to happen in the next six months since once 
you’ve bought something, you’re going to hang onto it for several years.“ 
(Forecaster working for Bank).  
 
4.5 The purpose and use of forecasts 
There variety of reasons for producing forecasts matched the variety in the forecasts 
themselves.  For those forecasters working within investing organisations, one of the 
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primary purposes is to predict the future performance of existing or prospective asset 
groups, to assist in making decisions about what to buy or sell (including spotting 
current mis-pricing, by comparing the returns based on the predicted cash flows with 
the returns implicit in current market pricing) or what allocations to put into funds. 
Investing organisations may also use internal forecasts to support specific 
acquisitions; although this may be reinforced by external forecasts when, for 
example, the size of investment demands it.  
 
Where the question in an organisation is the extent of the allocation to property, 
rather than whether to invest in property, the focus for the forecasting is to determine 
the relative performance of different sectors and/or assets.  
 
“We get given the money, we have money in property, that’s it, end of 
story.  So what we need to do is make the most out of that money.  What 
we are therefore concerned about is, are the forecasts getting the 
relativities right?”  
(Forecaster working for Fund Manager) 
 
Where property consultants are responsible for managing funds, they may use their 
own forecasts as inputs into strategic investment decisions for clients’ portfolios.  
Forecasts produced by property consultants may also be used to support specific 
cash flow analyses undertaken on behalf of clients, at varying levels of detail and 
transparency:  They are also used to support more general client-specific requests 
for advice on specific markets.  This work may often precede the more detailed cash 
flow forecasting later applied to specific assets in that market.  In this sense 
forecasting is viewed not as an end in itself, but rather as part of larger package to 
provide the level of advice clients require to enable them to make informed decisions 
and enhance those decision processes.   
 
“Once they have then gone into the market and they’ve got three 
different buildings to look at, then you will start doing some cash flows.  
What they want to know is, yes, Brussels is going to outperform Paris, 
now is a good time to go into the market, is it going to be driven by yield 
compression, what sort of building should they use.  So it’s not numbers, 
it’s advice, forecasts are part of what leads to.”   
(Forecaster working for Property Consultant) 
 
“We do have direct income from forecasting but also it supports internal 
clients in fee-bearing work that they’re doing, in holistic property advice 
of which a small part could be the property forecasting side or could be 
the property forecasting side going into the strategic side, with a 
separate investment strategist actually building on the work that I do.” 
(Forecaster working for Property Consultant) 
 
In one instance, this advice was being formulated in a “brokerage” fashion, being 
combined with market based data on transactions and deals to arrive at definitive 
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buy-sell-hold recommendations.  For forecasters such as this, whose service offer 
included broader investment advice, credibility was important and forecasting was an 
important means of securing this. 
 
“If I go into meetings with clients and link the results of my forecasting 
analysis to deals, to my understanding of what actually drives the market, 
then I will be taken seriously and  will be able to influence decisions.  
Which is the be-all and end-all of why you are forecasting.”   
(Forecaster working for Fund Manager) 
 
Forecasts are sometimes regarded in some sections of the industry as produced 
largely for general profile-raising of producers with current or prospective clients or 
investors.  With some exceptions, however, this did not figure prominently in the 
interviews. 
 
4.6 The form of models 
In the virtually all cases, the forecasting was based on some form of econometric 
modelling.  For all but local markets, this was based on time-series analysis, almost 
invariably using multiple-regression.  Local market forecasting (with the notable 
exception of the London markets) was more likely to be based on cross-sectional 
models, typically built from assembling local market information or local economic 
information about a particular town.  In some instances, an alternative approach was 
adopted, with local models derived in a top-down fashion from regional or national 
level forecasts. This necessitated the local forecast being driven by the historic 
relationships between, for example, a local authority area and its region, or a town 
and its region.  Achieving consistency in the nesting of different levels of forecasts 
was described as sometimes problematic (i.e. the sub-forecasts did not add up to the 
whole). 
 
For time-series regression models, office markets were the most developed.  For 
these markets, forecasters appeared to have the same overall specification for time-
series models across different markets, but work with different coefficients.  The 
relationship between rents and vacancy rates was seen as central to understanding 
and prediction in office markets.  Determining vacancy requires, in turn, separate 
models to forecast demand and supply variables. 
 
“For office markets the basic equation is the rate of change of rents as a 
function of the level of vacancy.  There is a natural rate of vacancy and if 
vacancy is above that then rents will fall, and the more above it is, the 
faster they will fall.  Retail markets are much more difficult, because we 
haven’t got vacancy for most retail markets.” 
(Forecaster working for Bank) 
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“We take a multi-equation approach, using the relationship between net 
absorption or gross take-up, and historical demand drivers.  We’d project 
that forward, with our assumptions based on local research projections of 
what’s happening on the supply side.  We’d then look at the relationship 
between vacancy and rents, which encapsulate the supply-demand 
conditions.  This would feed into a vacancy rate projection….and that 
drives rents.” 
(Forecaster working for Property Consultant) 
 
This process has problems, because for not all markets are there time-series for 
supply and for demand variables, causing modellers to resort to proxies (e.g. take-up 
for demand).  This was described as most acute on the supply side, where in some 
markets the supply data, “of various degrees of plausibility”, only tends to go back for 
a short period, and in some markets doesn’t exist.   Again proxies were used (e.g., 
change in rents at some point in the past as a proxy for current vacancy levels). 
 
Forecasting of rental growth generally utilises basic macroeconomic variables, such 
as measures of consumer expenditure, inflation and economic output, each of which 
in turn will have been forecast.  Forecasters use these forecasts as inputs to their 
property models, but may adjust the input forecasts depending on their own view of 
the economy. 
 
Macro-level variables were considered to have limited use in forecasting local 
markets, in that they appeared to show little historical correlation in general or at 
turning points in particular.  The sophistication of these local models varied, 
depending upon the maturity of the markets.  Where these local  models were cross-
sectional, there appeared more susceptible to change, attributed to their greater 
reliance on qualitative information. 
 
Retail forecast models presented different problems to office market models.  
Vacancy rates were generally not available so retail models were described as 
largely a function of retail demand (a reasonable assumption, for high street retail at 
least, where supply may well be fixed).   Modelling industrial markets was seen as 
combining the difficulties of suitable demand and supply data.  
 
5. Making qualitative adjustments 
The interviews conducted for this study confirmed that, almost universally, the first, 
essential stage in the process of producing property market forecasts is one based 
on quantitative modelling of historic and/or (other) forecast data, typically using 
regression techniques.  It is equally clear, however, that the process does not stop at 
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the output from such models.  Again, almost universally, some form of qualitative 
judgement or influence is brought to bear on the output, which frequently causes the 
forecasts either to be adjusted, or qualified, before they are passed on to users.  
What follows is a description of the nature of these judgements and influences, as 
revealed by the interviews. 
 
5.1 In-house judgements and influences 
The most immediate kind of feedback is that available within the producing 
organization from people who may not use the forecast themselves, but who share 
some form of common interest with those who will use the forecast (e.g. agents).  
The importance of this form of feedback obviously depends upon the type and range 
of advice within the organization.  Where this advice is available from people actually 
working for the organization “on-the-ground” in the markets – something more likely 
in the property consultant/agent organizations - it can take two forms.  First there is 
factual data that may be known to the people in the market, but is not typically or 
easily available to the forecaster.  Second, there is a more qualitative kind of 
feedback, typically represented by market sentiment, or knowledge of the current 
preferences of market participants that have yet to be manifest in data or statistics.  
Although this doesn’t necessarily lead to adjustments, this appears valued by 
forecasters, because it reveals what the historic data patterns cannot always expect 
to reflect.  
 
“Econometric models are fine, they describe what has happened in the 
past, but sometimes there are dynamics in markets which it’s useful to find 
out about in a sort of qualitative way and we will always talk through with 
people on the ground as to actually what is happening in their markets and 
that would add information to help and inform the forecasts.” 
(Forecaster working for Property Consultant) 
 
A third potential form of feedback is direct challenge to the forecast numbers, by the 
suggestion of alternatives.  This doesn’t generally appear to happen, unless it is 
accompanied by an argument based on factual accuracy or sentiment issues.   
 
Capturing the first two forms of this feedback is usually done by the forecaster 
presenting the “draft” forecast to the market team.  Usually this is face-to-face, 
although in some instances it is done by telephone, where the travel logistics (e.g. 
around European cities) make this more practical.  The discovery of factual errors 
revealed by market feedback generally results in modification of the forecasts; 
although the scope for this kind of adjustment appears greater the more localised the 
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forecasts are, because local market knowledge is likely to have a commensurately 
larger impact on the forecast assumptions.  
 
“We’d get feedback, such as oh no, they’re not building that 20,000 square 
metre tower any more, or that guy who was going to relocate here is not 
coming anymore, or rents weren’t that high in 1998, your historical data is 
wrong.  So we’d feed all this in and think about how best to incorporate it.  
If it’s hard factual information, we’d just run the models again and we get a 
different answer.”   
(Forecaster working for Property Consultant) 
 
“With the draft forecasts we will then talk to our people on the ground and 
see whether there any short terms plans that we are missing, are there any 
specific deals that are happening in the market which we ought to be 
aware of, are there any other issues that they think the forecasts aren’t 
picking up”. 
(Forecaster working for Property Consultant) 
 
Where the feedback is based on signals of sentiment or market mood, the response 
varies more widely.  This form of feedback may result in changes, or may simply be 
set alongside the original numbers as commentary.  The discretion on this appears to 
lie with the forecaster.  In large part, the decision between change and just simply 
comment rests on the extent to which the forecasters are persuaded of the validity of 
the markets people’s views.  Merely adding the views as commentary to the forecast 
appears to be the line of least resistance, although this is tempered by forecasters’ 
recognition of the need to maintain good working relationships with the providers of 
feedback; relationships which may be prejudiced if the forecasters appear too rigid in 
their response and fail to take some account of their colleagues’ views.   
 
“We’d question their judgement, and whether it was enough to think 
seriously about modifying the output of the model or, more likely, you 
would include that in your commentary, to go with the forecast” 
(Forecaster working for Property Consultant) 
 
“As far as the client is concerned, we would typically pass on the full 
reservations or praise, whatever it was that the agents said, even if it 
wasn’t built into the model….so we will say here is our forecast, but you 
should be aware that there are some more positive views of the market 
locally or negative views of the market locally.” 
(Forecaster working for Property Consultant) 
 
“The qualitative information will colour the forecasts in some way.  It 
depends how solid we think the information is.  So if we are not particularly 
happy that the message that they’re delivering to us is supported by the 
information in the data, we won’t modify the forecast very much.”  
(Forecaster working for Property Consultant) 
 
Some interviewees drew the distinction between adjustments for the short-term and 
longer-term forecasts, suggesting that it is only the short-term forecasts that would be 
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changed as a result of feedback from those close to the market9.  Forecasters’ 
willingness to do this is strengthened, however, when the short-term forecast is 
problematic, as was generally acknowledged to be the case with yield forecasts. 
 
“We will take views from our economist, as to where he thinks the market is going to go, 
and will then adjust the forecasts for the whole five year period, but the front end will be 
done by talking to the markets guys”.  
(Forecaster working for Fund Manager 
 
“”The short-term picture, the agents know, but I’m not going to let the agent tell me what 
the medium term view might be.” 
(Forecaster working for Property Consultant) 
 
“For yields, on the one-year view, you’ll get a much better view from somebody in the 
market than you can from someone trying a statistical forecast.”  
(Forecaster working for Fund Manager) 
 
5.2 User influences and adjustments 
As well as seeking feedback from colleagues within their own organization whose 
interest in the forecast is tangential, most forecasters also periodically discuss their 
current forecasts with internal and external users (clients).  Not surprisingly, this is 
more likely to occur where the forecaster-user relationship is strong, or even 
formalised, as for example, where the users are part of the same overall organisation 
or the client relationship is of long-standing.  Sometimes forecasters referred to these 
meetings as being an opportunity to persuade users of the robustness of their 
forecasts, or even correct users’ misconceptions concerning data.  Mirroring the 
feedback from in-house colleagues, however, some interviewees also conceded that 
the opposite might apply, with information valuable to the forecaster being revealed, 
as for example, where the market was undergoing fundamental change and the 
forecasting model becoming less valid. 
 
Most who discussed this issue appeared to value the role of users in helping 
forecasters to better understand the workings of the market.  Most were willing to 
accept that that their models might not be capturing everything and accordingly were 
prepared to show some flexibility in adjusting their forecasts to take account of users’ 
insights.  
 
“I think it is very easy as an econometrician to pooh-pooh gut feeling, but 
actually gut feeling really means that they have their own models which 
                                                 
9 The same appeared true of feedback from users: “Generally, the people in the market, the deal-doers, 
will always have a slightly different view to the forecasters in the longer term.  The shorter term has 
already been adjusted to their kind of view anyway, in terms of where we think the market currently 
is.”  (Forecaster working for Fund Manager) 
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they have built up over 30 years of experience and they can’t articulate 
them very well but they probably have some validity.” 
(Forecaster working for Bank) 
 
“This last session convinced me that econometrics won’t do the job as we 
singularly failed to foresee the latest down-turn, whereas our (users) 
actually did see it, ahead of time.  So it’s somehow also trying to blend in a 
sort of high level insight that you can get from these people.” 
(Forecaster working for Property Company) 
 
A minority took a different view, being more inclined to stand by their models and 
generally resistant to much more than minor modification to their outputs.  
 
“Why bother with a model if you’re then going to change the outputs” 
(Forecaster working for Property Consultant) 
 
In one instance, with a forecaster whose role in the organization was wider than just 
forecasting, a different rationale for adjusting the bare forecast was advanced. 
 
“I want to focus on ensuring that our acquisition professionals are focused 
on the right markets where I think the best performance is going to come 
from.  And if that means altering the rental growth numbers so that they 
believe them, while keeping those broad calls in place, then I will do that.”  
(Forecaster working for Forecaster/Investment Adviser) 
 
There was no evidence of users, including external clients, pressuring forecasters to 
modify their forecasts.  In some instances, however, forecasters appeared to be 
anticipating client reaction and sometimes pre-adjusting their forecasts or advice to 
deal with this.  This was generally linked to the issue of “extreme” forecasts (infra). 
 
“Our models were certainly saying that there was the threat of declines in 
rental values in that market in 2000.  Now I couldn’t go out in a publication 
and put declining rental values, because nobody would believe me.  So 
you have to present it in a way that makes it acceptable, there has to be an 
element of acceptability when you present a forecast.”  
(Forecaster working for Forecaster/Investment Adviser) 
 
5.3 Adjustments from extreme values 
There was some evidence from the interviews that forecasters were averse to 
releasing predictions of significant shifts, such as growth or return in double digits 
(even though examination of the historical data clearly shows that this happens, 
sometimes recurrently– e.g. all-property total returns in the late 1970s).  The 
psychological barrier may also involve the transition from positive to negative, rather 
than just be a question of size.10  To some extent, this form of cognitive dissonance 
appeared to stem from individual’s prior experience, or from tacit understandings 
                                                 
10  “They might only be minus two but to me there’s a massive great red mark next to it”  (Forecaster 
working for Fund Manager) 
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within the organization (the latter based on the relative worth of precise numbers 
against broad indicators of market direction). 
 
“I suppose you learn, and you’re constrained by your own experience in 
that sense.  I mean, if you see anything in double figures, you think, oh my 
god” 
(Forecaster working for Fund Manager) 
 
“Who the hell is going to put down forecasts of minus 20, or minus 10, it 
never happens.  Forecasters tend to be conservative in their approach.  I 
think they tend to limit the range of their forecasts.  It’s very rare to see big 
numbers, whether positive or negative.” 
(Forecaster working for Fund Manager) 
 
“There are barriers to the size of forecasts, below 10 and you don’t need to go anymore 
extreme.  More importance is attached to getting the relative performance correct.” 
(Forecaster working for Property Consultant) 
 
Two interviewees, however, acknowledged that experienced had taught that extreme 
forecasts could turn out to be correct (the Spanish office market in the late 1990s 
being given as one example).  In another, 
 
“I can remember when our rental growth figures were coming out for offices in double 
digits, and we thought “double digits, you’ve go to be joking!”  Unfortunately, they did hit 
double digits, so it’s dangerous to overwrite your model.” 
(Forecaster working for Fund Manager) 
 
The aversion does not necessarily appear confined to the forecasters, but may also 
be present in the behaviour of others who might, within the forecast production 
process, cause adjustments to be made. 
 
“I once came up with a forecast for the industrial market.  The figure 
seemed high, something like minus 27%, rental growth.  Anyway it was 
shaved down because, it’s the real world.  First of all, the research group 
shaved it down, to, 18% or something, because, well, we’ve never seen 
one of them before.  Then it was shaved down again when it went through 
to the fund managers - that looks ridiculous, so I think it’s got to be minus 
12.  Anyway, everybody had something to say because they felt 
uncomfortable with the number, basically, and a big number like that 
makes you feel uncomfortable.” 
(Forecaster working for Property Consultant) 
 
The reasons for this aversion appear complex.  At one level it is tied to the doubt 
among forecasters that extreme output values are fundamentally credible, on the 
basis that their models have limited scope to generate extreme predictions. 
 
“A lot of modellers will tell you, if they’re honest, that in modelling rental 
growth they get very little variability in those rental forecasts, because if 
you look at a lot of these models, the output is fairly static.  To get very wild 
swings in those numbers, you need very strange things happening to 
economic variables, which just does not happen.  So there is a problem 
with a lot of models because that volatility isn’t there.”   
(Forecaster working for Forecaster) 
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Where such predictions do occur, however, forecasters would scrutinise the forecast 
assumptions for supportive economic explanations, for co-occurring events that could 
help explain something that was a valid indicator rather than just a statistical 
aberration.   
 
“If we see large numbers we probably won’t believe them.  If the model’s 
generating double digit growth or double digit negative growth then you 
should really pay attention and say to yourself “well, why don’t we believe it 
or why has the model done that” and then look at it, and say, right, the 
model’s done that because supply is very much under control, or whatever. 
And really start investigating the series.”  
(Forecaster working for Fund Manger) 
 
Forecasters appear more likely to expend effort on such investigation if the forecast 
is being “applied”, as for example for valuation purposes or for stock selection, than if 
it is simply providing background on trends for some wider purpose, such as overall 
strategy (in which case it would be regarded as an aberration and simply excised). 
 
As noted above, some attributed the aversion to assumptions about user reaction to 
such figures, and especially to the resulting credibility of those producing figures, with 
one interviewee suggesting that the property market data underlying the forecast are 
never sufficiently robust to take a chance in this respect.  The fear of getting it wrong 
– and the consequences to credibility - appeared to be one justification for adopting a 
conservative stance. 
 
“Big numbers are not necessarily a problem for me but certainly are for my 
clients.  You have to present something that you think that your client base 
is going to accept, because if you don’t present it in that way, they just 
don’t pay regard to it.” 
(Forecaster working for Forecaster/Investment Adviser) 
 
“What we tend to do is, the range tends to be squeezed a bit to make it 
look, not so much more appealing but, it’s because then you can be maybe 
less wrong.” 
(Forecaster working for Fund Manager) 
 
“Very few forecasters that are prepared to put their head above the parapet 
and say no, we actually think it’s 20% this year, or it’s minus 20%.  Their 
name rides on the back of it, and if they get it horribly wrong and they call 
20%, and it’s actually minus 20%, then it will discredit their forecast and 
they don’t do that, what they do is say it’s going to be 10%.  That’s the way 
the forecasts are done, they’re not calling extremes, no forecaster will.” 
(Forecaster working for Fund Manager) 
 
This loss of credibility issue was not wholly confined to the reaction of external 
clients, with one interviewee referring specifically to in-house organizational tensions 
as a contributory factor to the forecasters’ cautious approach: 
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“It had to be flattened off at zero or something like that, just because of the 
message that might be taken up.  In that instance there was political 
rumbling within companies, with the relationship between research and the 
agents not particularly good at that time.” 
(Forecaster working for Property Consultant) 
 
In contrast, some of the interviewees – although a minority – appeared more relaxed 
about forecasting extreme values, citing markets (e.g. City of London offices) where 
such patterns were not atypical, or stressing the subsidiary role of forecasting within 
broader investment advice and the need to meet clients’ expectations that advisers 
will take a strong view - “it’s appalling if you say everything is going to be average, it 
can’t add value” (Forecaster working for Bank).  However, in a different institutional 
context, exceeding the average appeared to be more problematic. 
 
“With the local forecasts, it was hard to get anything above average.  If you had a very 
strong result they’d want to temper it down to the average, but the ones below the 
average weren’t tempered up.”  I have no problem with extreme forecasts but other 
people don’t like it.” 
(Forecaster working for Fund Manger) 
 
5.4 The impact of qualitative adjustments 
Although there was a wide difference of opinion on the extent to which the forecast 
from the quantitative model would change before release of the final figure – and the 
reasons for doing this - it appears that with most, though not all, forecasters’ 
adjustments are always made.  An important factor in determining this appears to be 
the nature of the markets, with market size and market maturity tending to make the 
quantitative forecast more resistant to qualitative modifications. 
 
“For some of our European forecasts where our data is less 
comprehensive, slightly lower quality and the model is not quite so robust, 
we will take account of what the people on the ground are saying a little bit 
more.”   
(Forecaster working for Property Consultant) 
 
The importance of making these adjustments becomes greater at turning points in 
the market, which the qualitative inputs may capture much better than the statistical 
data driving the models.  Not surprisingly, reaching agreement between the 
forecasters and the market informants as to when the turning point was approaching 
or had arrived was “incredibly difficult”. 
 
Only three of the interviewees expressed views on the impact of typical adjustments, 
in terms of the relative contributions of the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of 
the process.  These varied, but in each case the contribution of the qualitative 
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adjustment appeared substantial.  One interviewee, working for a fund manager, put 
the qualitative contribution at 50%, possibly less on occasions.  He contrasted this 
with his experience working for a property consultant, where the quantitative 
contribution was “much more significant”.  A second, working for an investment 
adviser, put the qualitative contribution at 30%, which he contrasted with the 
impression given by the academic forecasting literature, from which “you would get 
perception that the quants are more important than they actually are”.   The third, 
working for a property company – and using a broader range of techniques than most 
of the interviewees – felt that “econometric modelling is only about 20% of the 
process.”  
 
5.5 Herd Behaviour? 
Most of the forecasters who were interviewed were interested in what other 
forecasters were predicting.  A minority were not, other than perhaps to enable them 
to tell clients their stance in relation to others forecasters.  For those who were 
interested, the availability of others’ forecasts, and the quality of what they could see, 
naturally varied.  Sometimes availability only came with a lag, with suppliers unwilling 
to widely release detailed versions of their forecasts until some time had elapsed.  
Availability depended not least on the resources or influence of the “receiving” 
organization, with some faring better than others. 
 
“In addition to our two our two main providers, we also get forecasts from 
the likes of Jones Lang, Richard Ellis, DTZ, Healy and Baker, Hillier 
Parker, King Sturge, and we take it all on board”  
(Forecaster working for Fund Manager) 
 
“I get reports from a variety of people.  But it’s sometimes difficult to get 
hold of what other people say or what other people think.  Some will 
provide you with the numbers, for a quid pro quo, but other organisations 
are very secretive and want to keep their numbers to themselves.” 
(Forecaster working for Fund Manager) 
 
Frequently, interest in other people’s forecasts was justified as effectively helping to 
improve the forecaster’s understanding of their own forecasts.  It appeared to be 
helpful to know the views of the property market consensus, of the agents and of 
specialist forecasting houses, on the basis that it was possible via these to seek an 
understanding of why they held their views.  Achieving this understanding is not 
always possible and it was not wholly clear just how well other forecasts could be 
interpreted, given that there is a degree of secrecy about the underlying models.  
This interpretation of reasons for differences and similarities appears to be based at 
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the level of broad views or arguments rather than through detailed scrutiny of the 
models themselves. 
 
“You work out why you are out of line, and if you think your reasons for 
being out of line are good ones then you remain out of line.  But it’s difficult 
to do that unless you can get access to the models that they are using and 
they are often quite secretive about how exactly they generate the 
numbers.” 
(Forecaster working for Bank) 
 
“Without knowing the insides of their models we’re not able in detail to 
judge the reasons why other forecasts may differ.  You can make 
inferences, that they must be making different assumptions about this and 
that” 
(Forecaster working for Property Consultant) 
 
“It’s hard to actually investigate and understand why those forecasts are 
different, because we only anecdotally get information on the other 
forecasts.  So we don’t get a lot of detail.” 
(Forecaster working for Forecaster/Investment Adviser) 
 
Where close analysis of others’ forecasts was not feasible, inspecting these forecasts 
still held attractions, but more to give a fuller picture of what others were doing.  For 
example, a forecast incorporating a radical view might draw attention to an insight 
previously overlooked.  But beyond perhaps broad improvement of forecasters’ own 
insights, it is difficult to discern quite what the consequences of awareness of other 
forecasts are.  According to the interviewees, they appear rarely, if ever, to result in 
direct changes to forecasts.  Some interviewees, however, implied that there may be 
an underlying herd affect, or at least that the wish not to be too extreme may be a 
shared one.11  
 
“The major private practice firms that produce forecasts tend to be very 
similar in their approach.  I can almost guarantee most of the 
forecasts…will be kind of clustered because, from experience, people who 
do forecasts tend to look at other people’s forecasts.”  
(Forecaster working for Fund Manager) 
 
“If you are right people say, well done, and they forget about it, but if you 
are wrong, people may never forget.  So there is this incentive to sort of 
huddle together” 
(Forecaster working for Bank). 
 
Others gave reasons why such similarities might not be surprising. 
 
“The major private practice firms are all using the same kind of systems as producers, 
the software is generally the same, they tend to do the forecasts the same way, and 
they will use similar sources of inputs for the economics.” 
(Forecaster working for Property Consultant) 
                                                 
11  By contrast, this was not the experience of an interviewee with experience of the US, who found it 
“fascinating how at the same point in time two forecasting houses can have very different views of 
the world.”  
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“Other people’s forecasts are similar to ours, and I suppose that is because we all look 
at the same data and we all have the same basic understanding of how markets work.  
You can see how a group of people who have a basic understanding of economics and 
real estate markets and a basic understanding of how to build models are probably 
going to come up with similar sort of forecasts.” 
(Forecaster working for Bank). 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
The demand for forecasts from investors demonstrates their central role in decisions 
about real estate investment.  Uncertainty, however, is inherent in the forecasting 
process, due to (a) the intrinsic nature of the estimate (as a point drawn from a 
probability distribution); (b) the problems of data availability and reliability in real 
estate markets; and (c) the inherent limitations of econometric methods.  This 
uncertainty creates the opportunity and the justifiable motive for forecast modification 
by both users and producers.  The wider literature on forecasting confirms that these 
issues are not confined to real estate forecasting. 
 
Some of the findings from this investigation are not surprising.  Although forecasters 
are using some common tools (most notably a five year forecasting horizon and a 
multiple regression approach), and there are embryonic attempts to agree common 
definitions, real estate forecasters are using a range of inputs and data sets to form 
models to predict an array of variables for a range of locations.  Given the range of 
choices to be made about the identification and measurement of these variables, at 
the model formation stage the use of judgement is inevitable. 
 
The findings clearly point to widespread respect from forecasters for input from 
expert market participants, whose contribution to the process is valued beyond that 
of market scanning for missing or erroneous data.  Resulting adjustments appear 
well-considered.  At the same, and because of the nature of forecasts as frequently 
part of a wider advice package, forecasters are acutely aware of the importance of 
maintaining client confidence and credibility.  Forecasts need to be acceptable to 
their users (and purchasers) and consequently forecasters generally have incentives 
to avoid presenting contentious or conspicuous forecasts.  There is clear evidence of 
these tendencies among a number of the forecasters in this study, with forecasts 
being adjusted to reduce this kind of risk.   
 
There is little compelling evidence of herd behaviour, other than that manifest via the 
aversion to extreme forecasts, which appears embedded in the forecast process, if 
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not always necessarily in the forecasters as individuals.  Where extreme forecasts 
are generated by a model, forecasters often engage in ‘self-censorship’ or are 
‘censored’ following in-house consultation.  This distrust of large numbers may be a 
rational bias given the range of uncertainties about the inputs and the models – in 
addition to the reputational risks referred to above.  In this respect, however, it is not 
surprising that research has found that forecasts are often smooth relative to the 
underlying market. 
 
As predicated at the outset of this study, it is clear that the forecasting process is 
more complex than merely carrying out econometric modelling and that the impact of 
the influences within this process vary considerably across different organizational 
contexts.  This paper has presented only a partial discussion of the full results of the 
research and further papers will address how forecasts are communicated to users 
(with particular emphasis on the communication of uncertainty and the limitations of 
forecasts) and how forecasters’ evaluate their success or failure. 
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 Appendix 1 
 
Code Name Description of what code refers to Code 
No. 
Big numbers The nature of the forecaster's reaction to forecast outputs 
which are extreme in relation to the "normally" expected range 
1 
Communicating with 
clients 
Discussion of the forecast with clients (excluding discussion in 
its production), including identification of the quantitative and 
qualitative components and their robustness. 
2 
Cycles Discussion of aspects of the cyclical nature of markets 3 
Data consids A general code for data considerations not covered by the more 
specific data consideration codes. 
4 
Data consids - 
availaibility variatn 
The variations in the availability and/or qualityof data across 
different markets and sectors. 
5 
Data consids - base to 
fcast off 
The problem of correctly identifying the current level of rent (or 
yield) off which to base future forecasts. 
6 
Data consids - data 
measurement 
The problem of consistency in the way data is measured, 
expressed and recorded (for example, differing definition and 
interpretations of prime, CBD etc). 
7 
Ease-difficulty The relative ease or difficulty of property market forecasting in 
comparison to forecasting other economic variables (excluding 
the particular problems of yield forecasting). 
8 
Ease-difficulty - Yield 
forecasts 
The particular problem of yield forecasting and reasons 
attached to this. 
9 
Ec'metric models The general issue of the use of econometric models as a model 
form in property forecasting, including their nature and 
attributes. 
10 
Ec'metric models -Re-
est or restruct 
The particular issue of how often and for what reason(s) 
econometric models used in property forecasting are re-
estimated, recalibrated or more radically restructured. 
11 
Fcast context A general code for contextual forecasting issues not captured 
by any of the specific contextual codes. 
12 
Fcast context - others 
role in Produ 
The role of non-forecasters in the production of forecasts. 13 
Fcast context - what 
form of models 
A description of the form of model(s) used in property 
forecasting. 
14 
Fcast context - what 
markets&sectors 
A description of the markets and/or sectors covered by the 
forecaster's forecasts. 
15 
Fcast context - what 
vars forecast 
A description of the output variables produced and/or published 
from the forecaster's forecasts. 
16 
Fcast context - who are 
the clients 
A description of the external or in-house users of the forecasts. 17 
Fcast context- F's non-F 
role 
Discussion of any aspects of the forecasters role that extends 
beyond pure forecast production. 
18 
Fcast context- why R 
fcasts produced 
The reasons why forecasts are produced and/or the purposes to 
which they are applied. 
19 
Fcast failures Descriptions of circumstances when forecasts have been 
significantly incorrect, and possible discussion of reasons why 
(but excluding specific instance of structural breaks and the 
London downturn). 
20 
 32
Fcast failures - Lond 
downturn 
Discussion of the specific problem of forecasting the London 
downturn of recent times. 
21 
Fcast failures - reliance 
on MEFs 
The specific problem of the reliance of property forecasts on 
macro-economic forecasts (NB this links to the node: Mac-econ 
fcasts - Nature of vars.) 
22 
Fcast failures - 
structural breaks 
Discussion of structural break as a reason for a model failing or 
becoming unsuitable in its existing form.  
23 
Fcast horizon The future time horizon(s) over which forecasts are produced. 24 
Fcast horizon - Mean 
reversion 
The nature of the assumptions about mean reversion. 25 
Freqcy of production How often the forecasts are produced and/or updated. 26 
From market to building Discussion of issues relating to the transfer of forecasts of 
markets/market sectors/geographical sectors to specific 
buildings. 
27 
Get fcast right A general code for issues relating to getting the forecast right 
that are not captured by the more specific codes relating to 
this. 
28 
Get fcast right- feeling 
right 
Interviewees' explanations of what makes a forecast "feel" right 
or wrong when it is first produced. 
29 
Get fcast right-
rules4acceptability 
The rules, checks or procedures adopted to evaluate the 
robustness (generally statistical) of the model before it is finally 
agreed upon and prior to wider dissemination 
30 
Herd behaviour & 
others' forecasts 
The extent to which forecasters are aware of other people's 
forecasts of the same variables, the perceived usefulness of this 
knowledge and its impact on forecaster behaviour. 
31 
How fcasts used The forecaster's view as to the general appropriateness of the 
use to which the forecasts are put. 
32 
How fcasts used - by 
clients 
Description of the specific uses to which forecasts are put by 
clients. 
33 
How fcasts used - by 
others 
Description of the specific uses to which forecasts are put by 
users other than clients or valuers. 
34 
How fcasts used - by 
valuers 
Description of the specific uses to which forecasts are put by 
valuers. 
35 
How fcasts used - 
control 
The nature of the forecaster's control, or lack of control, over 
the use by others of his/her/their forecasts. 
36 
Interaction between 
models 
The linkages between models that cover different markets (e.g. 
regional-national, regional-local) and between different types of 
model (i.e. times series vs cross sectional). 
37 
Mac-econ fcasts - 
Nature of vars 
Discussion of the nature of the variables used as inputs to 
macro-economic forecasts, the problems associated with this 
and the implications for the use of macro-economic outputs as 
inputs to property forecasts.  
38 
ac-econ fcasts-sources 
& usefulness 
Sources of macro-economic forecast data and general 
discussion of their usefulness (but excluding specific discussion 
relating to any adjustments to such data - see code "Q adjusts 
to inputs"). 
39 
Other behavioural 
factors 
Catch-all code for behavioural factors and not covered by other 
codes. 
40 
Prop-cf-Econ fcasts Discussion of the similarities and/or differences between 
forecasting of property variables compared to forecasting of 
other economic variables. 
41 
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Q adjusts 2 inputs Discussion of whether outputs from macro-economic models 
are adjusted before being input to property forecasting models 
and reasons for any such adjustments.  
42 
Q adjusts2outputs Discussion of qualitative adjustments to forecasts and not 
captured in any of the related more specific codes. 
43 
Q adjusts2outputs-
clients aghast 
Specific instances of where outputs adjusted prior to publication 
because they are perceived as unacceptable to clients and/or 
markets. 
44 
Q adjusts2outputs-
Inhou consultation 
The nature of in-house consultation prior to finalisation or 
publication of the property forecast and the nature of any 
consequent adjustments to the forecast prior to its adoption. 
45 
Q adjusts2outputs-initial 
is final 
The frequency with which the initial forecast output is adopted 
as the final figure and discussion surrounding this (and not 
covered by other related codes). 
46 
Q adjusts2outputs-
market sentiment 
The particular influence of market sentiment upon adjustments 
made to initial property forecasts before their finalisation. 
47 
Q adjusts2outputs-user 
consultation 
The role and nature of consultation with users of forecasts as it 
relates to adjustments of initial forecasts prior to finalisation 
and also to ongoing adjustment of forecasts models over time. 
48 
QuantQual balance Discussion of perceptions of the respective contributions of the 
quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the process to the 
final figure. 
49 
Reviewing success Discussion of the concept of success in forecasting not captured 
by related more specific codes. 
50 
Reviewing success - 
procedures 
Description of any formal procedures used to compare past 
forecasts with actual outturn and discussion around this. 
51 
Reviewing success - 
timing it right 
Perceptions of the importance of the timing aspect of "success" 
in forecasting. 
52 
Reviewing success- 
Absol vs Rel 
The relative importance of absolute predictive success 
compared to success in predicting the relative performance of 
assets. 
53 
Role byond fcasting The role or activities of the forecaster additional to the pure 
forecast production. 
54 
Role byond fcasting-
Sellg the fcast 
The presence or not, nature and importance of, selling the 
forecast as a necessary part of the forecasting process. 
55 
The house view The concept of the house view and discussion about its role 
and importance in forecasting. 
56 
The story The concept of the story and its role and importance in 
forecasting. 
57 
Uncertainty A general code for aspects of uncertainty in property forecasts 
for issues not captured by the related more specific codes. 
58 
Uncertainty - means of 
expressing 
The methods, if any, adopted to convey the uncertainty 
inherent in property forecasts and discussion of problems 
related to this. 
59 
Uncertainty-
Communicating to 
clients 
Discussion of the methods adopted, if any, to convey to clients 
the uncertainty inherent in property forecasts, and discussion of 
the problems surrounding this (including the risks to forecaster 
credibility of raising this issue with clients). 
60 
Unexpected shocks How forecasts are modified following significant and 
unexpected events. 
61 
 
 
